

## **Summary of dissertation**

### **European Union's negotiations with the United States.**

#### **The analysis of negotiation power of the European Union from the perspective of game theory on selected cases**

Nowadays, there are many debates regarding the importance of the European Union on the international scene and the efficiency of its performance. This dissertation explores the issue of bargaining power of the European Union in the negotiations with the United States as well as the use of selected game theory approaches to measure this power and predict the results of international negotiations. The author studies the practical use of the selected approaches to analyse international negotiations and the conditions in which they are true, and then, presents the canon type of approaches which may be useful to study international negotiations, predict their results and assess the bargaining power of players.

Analysis of the Union's negotiation power was conducted on the basis of selected international negotiations of the European Union with the United States on extradition and mutual legal assistance, use and transfer of Personal Name Records (PNR) and processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data (SWIFT). The choice of such cases is not coincidental as it allows the analysis of the European Union power from the perspective of different decision-making processes and various policy areas over several years.

The aim of the following dissertation is to study the efficiency of the European Union in the negotiations with the United States and the conditions which shape such power through the analysis of the selected negotiation cases in the context of chosen approaches in the field of game theory. At the same time, the objective of the thesis is to prove the practical use and application of game theory to study political reality. The analysis of the veto players theory of George Tsebelis, bargaining power concept of Sophie Meunier, Thomas Schelling conjecture, multi-level games theory and agency theory made it possible to collect conditions in which they are useful in order to study negotiations as well as to present their limitations. Special attention is attracted to veto players and to EU's position towards status quo as well as to impact of these elements on negotiation power of the European Union. Additionally, the other factors identified during the analysis and influencing the EU's efficiency in negotiations were presented as well as weak and strong points of negotiation participants. The dissertation



focuses also on then relations between the European Union and the United States enriched by the discussion over the problems and difficulties that arised along with their influence on negotiation result.

The dissertation consists of the theoretical and empirical part. In part one, the concept of international negotiation was presented and discussed from the games perspective. The application of game theory to study political reality was also described together with the assumptions of the analysed approaches. With the aim of further analysis of EU's bargaining power, the legal and institutional structure of the European Union and its partner was studied in line with their decision-making processes. It gave the opportunity to identify in the empirical part the potential players who participated in the negotiations as well as to present and describe the model applied to analysis. Then, the study of the selected international negotiations was conducted in line with the adopted scheme. This was followed by the analysis and description of the impact of the players and other factors on the EU's negotiation power in each case.

The study was conducted on the basis of accessible official documents, analysis and reports as well as information shared by the interest groups. The author also interviewed experts engaged in the process of negotiations, which not only enriched the information regarding negotiations but also helped in interpretation of the negotiation result. To determine the outcome of negotiations, the author applied own model based on the one used so far by the other scholars and proposed the sequence of steps to be followed in comprehensive negotiation analysis.

The analysis of the selected negotiations leads to the conclusion that the impact on EU's bargaining power have both the number of veto players and who they are, which is determined by the applied decision-making process in the particular case. The EU power also depends on whether it seeks for changes of the actual situation or it defends its position. Furthermore, it was proved that the factors which are widely regarded as obstacles to Union's performance, can increase its efficiency. The studies made for the purpose of this dissertation confirm the functionality and usefulness of the selected approaches from the game theory area to analyse the political reality. However, it is necessary to remember about the need for comprehensive research on the negotiation situation and about the adjustment of the concepts to the particular negotiation conditions.